- Posted February 12, 2020
- Director-General Speeches
NZSIS Director-General Rebecca Kitteridge
ISC opening statement – Wednesday 12 February 2020
Open session
===
Tena koutou katoa.
Ko Rebecca Kitteridge tōku ingoa. Ko te kaiwhakahaere o Te Pā Whakamarumaru.
I am pleased to be here today, now in my sixth year of leading the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.
I will briefly outline some of the key threats New Zealand is facing and what NZSIS is doing to respond to them.
Firstly I will talk about our response to the terrible attacks in Christchurch last year.
As we know the attack on the Al Noor Mosque and Linwood Islamic Centre claimed 51 lives, left dozens injured and affected countless individuals, families and communities.
The attack naturally prompted questions about the performance of state sector agencies, of which the most important question is whether it could have been prevented.
That question is of course a key focus of the Royal Commission of Inquiry. The NZSIS fully supports the important work of the Royal Commission of Inquiry – indeed I was one of the agency heads which requested such an inquiry.
Independent scrutiny matters hugely to an agency like the NZSIS, because we depend on public confidence, understanding and support to do our work.
We must learn from this horrific event – and we will.
I am limited in discussing areas within the terms of reference of the Royal Commission, and I am also mindful of the forthcoming trial process later this year.
I can however talk briefly about our response to the attacks on the 15th of March.
Following the attack NZSIS went into an immediate, full scale 24/7 response.
Our work had three main areas of focus:
· First, getting a complete picture of the alleged attacker, particularly to understand whether any other attacks were planned.
· Second, reviewing everything we knew about extreme right-wing groups in New Zealand, to detect any potential “copycat attacks”.
· And third, detecting any suggestion of a revenge attack either in New Zealand or against New Zealand interests offshore.
We worked, and continue to work extremely closely with our Police colleagues. We were supported by the GCSB which assisted us through its technical capabilities and links with foreign intelligence partners.
We also engaged with our international counterparts around the world and we were hugely grateful for their cooperation and willingness to share whatever information they held that might help us to understand the intelligence picture.
Even agencies with whom we usually have little or no contact offered us whatever information they had that might be relevant to the investigation.
It is fair to say that this was a global intelligence response.
Since the attacks we have looked deeply at our operations. We have drawn on outside expert assistance to help us, and our findings have formed some of the information which has been provided to the Royal Commission of Inquiry.
While much of our internal review remains highly classified, and is still subject to consideration by the Royal Commission, I hope to be able to release an unclassified summary version in due course.
Our internal review suggests areas where we can strengthen and improve. As you would expect from a learning organisation, we are implementing those recommended improvements now rather than waiting for the outcome of the Royal Commission of Inquiry. We are also keen to receive the Royal Commission’s insights about areas that we can improve.
Terrorism Threat level
The Christchurch attacks altered the New Zealand terrorism threat picture significantly.
The Threat Level is set by the Combined Threat Assessment Group, or CTAG, which involves a range of relevant agencies and is hosted by the NZSIS.
On the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the national terrorism Threat Level moved from LOW to HIGH – a move that took into account many factors, including the possibility that the alleged perpetrator was part of a group, and the volatility of the security situation both in relation to possible copycat attacks or attacks in retribution.
Just over a month after the attacks CTAG reduced the Threat Level from HIGH to MEDIUM, where it remains today. This means that a terrorist attack is assessed as feasible and could well occur.
CTAG constantly monitors the New Zealand terrorism threat level.
Since the attacks the public has been more conscious of activities and views that raise national security concerns. That has led to a significant increase in the information we have received from the public.
Between March 15 and the end of June 2019 NZSIS received 455 pieces of lead information, a significant number of which were direct from the public.
Unsurprisingly, many of these pieces of lead information concerned people who had expressed racist, Nazi, identitarian, or white supremacist views.
Some members of the public have provided us with very important information, for which we are very grateful. I strongly encourage anyone who has concerns to contact us. Even if you are not sure that the information you have is important or not, we encourage you to provide the information to us or to the New Zealand Police so that we can make that assessment.
The number of individuals under active investigation by NZSIS over the last year has ranged between 30 and 50 at any one time. This variation comes as new persons of concern are identified, while others are assessed as not posing a threat.
I remain very proud of the work that NZSIS staff do in this area – they are professional, dedicated, and do a job which is rarely visible to the public, or recognised outside of their work environment.
Other threat issues
Threats of violence from those with extreme right wing views is not the only source of terrorist threat which New Zealand faces.
We know that ISIL’s capability has been severely degraded, but it has not been eliminated.
Al Qaeda and other groups such as the Somalian Al Shabaab also remain active internationally.
These groups and their supporters are still active online distributing extremist material, encouraging acts of violence and instructing their followers how to carry out attacks.
We remain concerned about individuals in New Zealand who subscribe to these group’s extremist views.
Challenges
Whatever the ideology that motivates violent extremists, identifying and investigating such individuals remains a huge challenge for intelligence and law enforcement agencies globally.
The use of encryption in chatrooms, apps, social media and other platforms (including gaming), to spread extremist material and to recruit is a worldwide issue. Anonymised identities are widely used, making it extremely difficult to assess the credibility of threats.
Clearly there is a legitimate place for encryption to protect people’s privacy and information.
Communities also need to be protected, however, from the threat of extremist violence. The balance must be found between giving law enforcement and intelligence agencies the ability in a lawful, properly managed and proportionate way to access encrypted forums, while still protecting individual privacy rights.
Global leadership is required to solve this difficult problem – it cannot be led alone by intelligence agencies such as the NZSIS, and nor should it. I believe the events in Christchurch are a compelling reason for New Zealand – and our international partners - to have robust and meaningful dialogue about security and where the lines between public safety and individual privacy should be drawn.
Foreign Interference
Foreign interference is another main area of risk that the NZSIS is responsible for investigating.
The scale and aggressive nature of state actors seeking to cultivate influence and undertake intelligence activities is rising around the world, and New Zealand is not immune.
We are fully aware of the democratic right to political expression, and the necessity for states to openly engage and negotiate with one other.
We therefore uses “foreign interference” only to describe an act by a foreign state, or its proxy, that is intended to influence, disrupt or subvert a New Zealand national interest by covert, deceptive or threatening means.
Foreign interference, so defined, does not include normal diplomatic activities or efforts to garner influence or shape perceptions or policy by open lobbying or persuasion.
The reality is however that some foreign intelligence services do have the intent and capability to target New Zealand’s interests both at home and offshore.
We have continued to see foreign state actors make persistent efforts to gain access to sensitive government and commercial information, and valuable intellectual property.
They have also made attempts to covertly influence individuals and institutions in ways that have a negative impact on our economy and wellbeing.
As well as investigating foreign covert activity, our approach is to raise awareness through targeted briefings in a range of sectors including central government, local government, academia, and the private sector. The purpose of these briefings is to help New Zealand organisations to understand and manage the risks they face more effectively.
I am also aware of the ongoing focus on the role of foreign interference in election processes overseas.
Andrew Hampton and I appeared twice before the Justice Committee Inquiry into the 2017 General Election and 2016 Local Election last year to discuss this issue.
I note that the Committee’s final report agreed with our assessment that interference in New Zealand’s elections by a state actor was a plausible scenario, and remains so.
We will continue to focus on detecting foreign interference, identifying individuals and groups involved, and gathering intelligence on their activities and likely aims.
Pacific
Turning now to the Pacific region. New Zealand’s national security is intrinsically linked to the security and prosperity of the region we share with our Pacific Island partners. The NZSIS is working with these partners to ensure a stable Pacific region, as well as informing wider New Zealand Government efforts to keep the region safe and secure. We liaise closely with other New Zealand agencies as part of this work.
Protective Security work
The NZSIS has a statutory role in providing protective security services, advice and assistance, with a key focus on the public sector.
We do this through our Protective Security Requirements programme, or PSR, which engages with organisations to help them protect their information, assets and people.
Last year I was appointed as Government Protective Security Lead to help with the ongoing uplift in government security practices.
Since the PSR programme began in 2014 I’m pleased to say there has been a significant increase in security awareness across government, with more government agencies adopting the framework.
We have also seen increasing interest from private sector organisations looking to improve their security posture.
There is still work to be done though, and improving security awareness has also had flow on effects for the NZSIS.
We have experienced a significant rise in demand from agencies for national security clearances, with an increase of almost 50% at the highest clearance levels – the levels that are most time-consuming to process.
This increase in demand has come at a time when the Vetting Team has undertaken an internal transformation of our processes. This work has resulted in a fundamental shift in the way we process our lower level clearances and the experience that agencies and customers have while obtaining a clearance.
Work is still underway to strengthen our processes for our top level clearances. This work should lead to gains similar to those we have seen at confidential and secret levels.
We have also worked in partnership with NZ Police this year to reduce the time taken for the NZSIS to receive Police reports. This is a vital part of the clearance process and any delays can have a significant impact on our ability to meet targets. Both the NZSIS and NZ Police are committed to working together to strengthen this essential part of the process.
Closing
In conclusion I can say that this has been a challenging year for the NZSIS.
NZSIS staff take their roles very seriously and they are committed to keeping our country safe.
I am proud of how they responded to the Christchurch tragedy and their commitment to supporting Police and other front line agencies.
I would like to thank them for their hard work and dedication which, as I mentioned earlier, is by necessity work which is rarely visible to the public.
I’m happy to take any questions you have.
END