Navigating domestic security threats in a world of uncertainty

An address by Rebecca Kitteridge, Director-General, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service

Delivered to the Wellington branch of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs

6 May 2021

Thank you to the Wellington branch of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs for the invitation to speak with you today. I truly appreciate the opportunity to talk about national security to a group that is so engaged in thinking about New Zealand’s place in the world.

I have always found it peculiar that, generally speaking – and with the notable exception of the last few weeks – national security and geopolitics rarely seem to provoke public discussion in Aotearoa New Zealand. That makes forums such as this very important.

The fact that there is relatively little public or media discussion and debate about national security and geopolitics is particularly surprising given that we live in a country that is deeply affected by international trends, and which relies on a complex set of international relationships for the health of its economy and its security.

You do not have to be a foreign policy expert to see that the world is increasingly uncertain, and New Zealand needs to navigate that uncertainty – including the global impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.  We will need all the public engagement on national security issues and geopolitical developments that we can muster in order to collectively guard against and mitigate the risks we face as a country.

I want to speak about national security today through the twin lenses of the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on Christchurch Masjidain on 15 March 2019, and the Covid-19 pandemic.

Both are set to have a lasting impact on our national security environment for many years to come and they both have a lot to teach us.

The Royal Commission of Inquiry’s report was very clear in saying that New Zealand needs to have a much more mature discussion about national security.

But how we talk about national security is crucial. I think we have a responsibility as a country to learn from the terrible events of 15 March and the Royal Commission that followed it, and to reframe what national security could and should mean for New Zealanders. Together we can learn how to approach national security with a greater sense of confidence and inclusion, and begin to understand that we all have a role to play in protecting Aotearoa’s freedoms and values.

Consider the success of New Zealand’s response to the global pandemic. Just as the country has banded together to mitigate the risk of Covid-19 – much to the envy of the rest of the world – I know we can come together to counter threats such as violent extremism and espionage, and set a global example in this respect too.

The key relates to social cohesion, and being really clear about the true nature of the threats that we are uniting against.  Social cohesion has been a central principle in the Government’s response to the 15 March mosque attacks right from the outset.  This is a uniquely New Zealand response to a terrorist attack and one which I believe will lead to better national security outcomes.

I hope that continuing to reframe national security in this way may help New Zealanders to embrace it as useful, legitimate and valuable: something that we are happy to talk about, and toward which we all feel a sense of responsibility.

Because, as the Royal Commission finds, historically in New Zealand this has not been the case.

National security – an uncomfortable topic in New Zealand

We live in a country that prides itself on openness and transparency, but we have never been comfortable talking about national security. I think there are lots of reasons for this, and they are traversed in the Royal Commission’s report: baggage from the Cold War days, missteps on the part of the agencies, complacency and lack of awareness on the part of the general public.

The result of not having a mature discourse between security practitioners, academics, politicians and the media is that some real national security issues have been discounted, and others have been sensationalised in a truly unhelpful way. Until the March 15 attacks, terrorism was seen as something that happens “overseas,” and espionage is probably still seen as something confined to a John le Carre novel.

I remember early in my tenure making a comment in the media, along the lines of “NZSIS worries about terrorism so you don’t have to.” At that time I was trying to talk about the influence of ISIS in New Zealand in a way that would not overly alarm people.

Looking back on it, though, I may have contributed to the idea that the public has no role, and that national security threats are somebody else’s problem to manage. That could not be further from the case – a theme to which I will return.

I think my instincts were right, though, in not wanting to sensationalise security threats. Many governments around the world create and emphasise fear and divisions when talking about national security – often to advance their own interests. There is a tendency to create a sense of exclusion about groups that are described as national security threats – the “reds under the beds” approach.

Treating entire groups or communities with suspicion or hostility leads to resentment, anger and reluctance to deal with security and law enforcement agencies – creating a vicious cycle.

This approach, as I have said on a number of occasions in the past, is completely counter-productive when it comes to achieving positive national security outcomes. It has the effect of preventing the population collectively from calmly engaging with the threats we face and contributing to their mitigation.

As an organisation, NZSIS has tried to navigate these issues, and I acknowledge that we have not always got it right. The Muslim community in particular has felt targeted. It has felt feared and excluded.  My apology to the Muslim community following the publication of the Royal Commission’s report recognises that we have contributed to that situation, and my engagement with representatives of that community since has deepened my understanding of their experience.

As an organisation, we will continue to reflect on the lessons of the events of 15 March and the Royal Commission. NZSIS has already changed a lot, and I am committed to our doing better in the future as we engage the New Zealand public and our diverse communities. We must continue to learn and adapt, and to do things differently.

Current threatscape

You can probably tell that I’m keen for a fresh approach to the public discussion about national security.

But before I talk more about that, it is worth reflecting on our assessment of the current threatscape.

It is clear that we live in an increasingly complicated and divided world.

Globally, the extreme online environment continues to spread a range of violent extremist narratives, conspiracy theories, hate and disinformation. 

Authoritarian governments are increasingly brazen in flexing their muscles both within their countries and internationally, interfering in and pressuring other governments.

The international rules-based order is under pressure. Countries are struggling to come together to solve collective issues like climate change and humanitarian disasters.

These international developments have a negative impact on a small liberal democracy like New Zealand: a country that is deeply interconnected with the rest of the world, that plays its part in contributing to international security, cares about human rights, and relies on trade and an international legal framework to flourish economically.

Regionally, we see pressure being put on our Pacific friends and neighbours by a range of state actors, creating a complicated picture.

Domestically, New Zealand is also affected by international trends.

New Zealand’s National Terrorism Threat Level remains at Medium, which means a terrorist attack is feasible and could well occur.

Through multiple media New Zealanders are exposed to the disruptive and potentially violent trends we see elsewhere.

The terrorist attacks of 15 March 2019 continue to influence violent extremism in New Zealand. The Christchurch attacks may inspire further attacks in New Zealand in the medium or long-term.

New threat actors emerge from nowhere, often with no clear affiliation to known identity-motivated extremist groups.

The amount of casual violent rhetoric used by white identity extremists on-line makes it extremely difficult for security and law enforcement agencies to judge who is mobilising to violence and who is just sounding off or indeed “joking” – assuming such rhetoric is unencrypted.

But white identity violent extremism is not the only terrorist threat that concerns us.  We continue to monitor faith-motivated extremists.  ISIS, which invented the on-line recruitment business model, has lost most of its physical territory but still has supporters around the world, including in New Zealand.

New Zealand also feels the ripples of other faith-motivated extreme ideologies, which may be deliberately encouraged by foreign governments that benefit politically from the divisions they cause. We are alert to the possibility of a range of faith-motivated ideologies gaining ground in New Zealand.

With any of these ideologies, the most likely terrorist attack scenario in New Zealand continues to be a lone actor committing an attack using easily obtainable weapons, such as bladed weapons, vehicles or firearms.

Aside from counter-terrorism, NZSIS also has a counter-intelligence remit.

There remain state actors who spy on and interfere with New Zealand’s democracy and economy to gain a strategic advantage. Interference efforts have been made against our political system at both central and local government levels. Ethnic communities within New Zealand are harassed.  We have seen universities and research institutions targeted by governments seeking to use our intellectual property for their own purposes, including military purposes. And increasingly we are concerned about state-sponsored commercial espionage against private sector companies in New Zealand.

So what is the impact of Covid-19 on this threat picture?

In many countries economic stress caused by the pandemic has created vulnerabilities that state and non-state actors will seek to exploit.

Around the world, the combination of economic and employment disruption, social isolation, and increased on-line activity is enabling and exacerbating violent extremist rhetoric.

Fortunately this situation is less acute in New Zealand. We have, though, seen the emergence of Covid-19 specific grievances and conspiracy theories amongst a small proportion of our population.  The prevalence of on-line rabbit holes of disinformation may radicalise some individuals in New Zealand.

Significant foreign intelligence activity is being driven by issues like vaccine access and distribution. Covid-19 has not been helpful to foreign intelligence officers wishing to visit our shores (or our region), but foreign intelligence agencies also work through proxies located in New Zealand, who have continued to be tasked.

And Covid-19 has been a great boon to both criminal and state-sponsored cyber actors.

In summary, we assess that Covid-19 has had and will continue to have a negative impact on national security, both internationally and domestically.

Intelligence cooperation

It is important to note that our understanding of the global threat picture is considerably enriched because of intelligence contributed by our international partners.

In responding to national security threats at both the international and domestic level, we place enormous importance on our intelligence relationships with our security and intelligence partners – and in particular those agencies in the Five Eyes partnership.

As the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister reflected over the last few weeks, New Zealand has a long-standing commitment to the Five Eyes intelligence partnership, which has endured over successive administrations.

I acknowledge the significant value that the New Zealand security and intelligence system receives and that we co-create by working together as a partnership.

For NZSIS these intelligence relationships have been crucial as we have navigated the aftermath of the Christchurch mosque attacks, and as we have sought to understand how the geopolitical plates are shifting due to the pressures of anti-democratic regimes, competition in our region and the massive disruption of the global pandemic.

Lessons from Covid-19

I turn now to consider New Zealand’s experience of responding to Covid-19, and to ask what the New Zealand security system can learn from it.

To recap: I have talked about the difficulty New Zealand has experienced in having a public conversation about national security.

And I have talked about the negative impact of Covid-19 on national security, both internationally and domestically.

But New Zealand’s experience of Covid-19, and our response to it, may also offer us some ideas about how to protect ourselves from the worsening security situation, and how to take a fresh approach to the public discussion about that.

New Zealand has been immensely successful in managing its response to the pandemic so far.  Other countries have not been as successful.

I think we can apply three lessons from Covid-19 with respect to national security in New Zealand.

The first lesson is to be very clear about the nature of the threats that face us as a country, and to unite against these threats. In the context of Covid-19 New Zealanders have been clear that the virus is the threat – and not, as in some other countries, our public health experts, or those expressing different views about the best way to tackle the pandemic.

So how can we apply this to national security?

We learn the importance of being very clear about the nature of the threats that face us.

In the counter-terrorism area the threats come from violent extremist groups, individuals, and ideologies. While violent extremists might seek to recruit from particular groups or communities, we should be very careful not to conflate them. The threats are not the groups or communities in our midst. They are not particular ethnicities, or mainstream religions or interest groups.

In the counter-intelligence area the threats come from specific foreign governments that conduct espionage or interference activities in our country.

We can unite against these threats – all of us, in every community.  Our collective and united efforts are the most effective way of building a safe and resilient country.

The second successful aspect of New Zealand’s response to Covid-19 has been the superb public communications effort. New Zealanders bought into the strategy of eliminating Covid-19 because they understood the risk the virus posed to our health system, our society and our economy. We have received clear information about what to look out for, and what to do if we see it.  We know we each have a role to play and by and large we have all played that role.

Importantly, according to the “Kiwis Count” survey conducted by Te Kawa Mataaho, the Public Service Commission, in the year to December 2020, public trust and confidence in the public service increased by 18 points. While the results are subject to interpretation (and probably represent a spike relating to a most unusual year) the evidence suggests that a significant factor in this result has been the clear communication, transparency, and perceived accountability relating to New Zealand’s response to Covid-19. Those responsible for the government response have been very visible, have fronted the media, and where things have gone wrong by and large they have been seen to take accountability.

Again, we can learn from the success of the Covid-19 communications effort in the national security area.  It is also reinforced by the Royal Commission.  The Royal Commission stressed the importance of New Zealanders having accessible, accurate information about the threats and risks we face as a nation. The Royal Commission said New Zealanders need to know enough to be able to identify behaviours of concern, and to know what to do if they see them.

I have already explained why the language of fear and exclusion does not create a good national security outcome. As with the Covid-19 communications campaign, effective communication about national security needs to create a sense of confidence and inclusion.

These ideas were raised recently by Rory Medcalf, head of the National Security College at the Australian National University[1] and I think they are really helpful in the New Zealand context.

Confidence can be built by responsible and thoughtful public discussion about the threats we face, and engaging with those threats through preparedness, resilience and responsibility.

We can also build confidence by linking national security to the values we hold dear as a society. In particular, I’m thinking about our commitment to democratic values and the rule of law; our desire to be open and transparent – both to one another and as a public service; our tradition of being an inclusive nation; and the increasing value our society places on the importance of wellbeing in all its various iterations. Communicating that national security is underpinned by our national values will help the public to support our mission of keeping New Zealand safe.

The Covid-19 communications campaign has also made it clear that everybody has a role in the elimination strategy.  We understand that the primary defenders are government officials working at the border, but all of us have responsibilities – to watch our hygiene, to use the contact tracing app, to look out for symptoms, to get tested if we are sick.

Again there are lessons here.  The highly professional staff in the intelligence and law enforcement communities are dedicated to the job of protecting the country against national security threats. But it is not their responsibility alone. 

We need the public to play their part. The Royal Commission found that even if our systems were different or better, it’s unlikely that we would have been able to detect the Christchurch terrorist. He had already radicalised when he arrived here and he was determined to keep a low profile.

When people radicalise here, though, we stand a better chance of detecting them, and families and friends play a crucial role in helping us. With good public education they may detect indicators of violent extremism.  And if we get the public engagement right, those family members or friends will know to contact the security and law enforcement agencies so we can act.

We can also see from the results of the Public Service Commission’s Kiwis Count survey that if the New Zealand Intelligence Community can be as open, transparent and accountable as possible – bearing in mind that there are limits that are generally understood – we will help to build public trust in our agencies and our work. And indeed New Zealand’s intelligence agencies have been on that journey for some time, through more media engagement, stronger oversight, releasing more information into the public domain, and through speeches such as this.

The third area where we can learn from New Zealand’s response to Covid-19 relates to the careful approach taken to issues relating to technology, data, and privacy.  In responding to the pandemic, the New Zealand public has understood the public health importance of being able to track and trace personal movements and connections, and how technology makes that effort quicker and more accurate. There has been a good public discussion about how the data would be collected, held, and used, and how private information would be protected.

Intelligence agencies around the world are grappling with immense challenges in detecting and monitoring national security threats.  The 15 March attacks – meticulously planned by a terrorist who did not reveal his plans to anyone – are an example of the challenges we face. The critical challenge faced by all security agencies such as ours is how to join dots and connect weak signals to reveal and understand would-be terrorists or other security threats.

Joining these dots is hugely assisted by having access to and analysing data. Using new and evolving technologies too is critical – especially since such technologies are used so effectively (and without legal authority or oversight) by those who would do us harm.

Let me be clear: I do understand that using data and technology in the context and legal framework of a pandemic is very different from the context and legal framework of national security. My point is that Covid-19 shows us that there can be a measured and informed public discussion about the public objectives and privacy trade-offs, leading to a broad consensus about the best balance.

Time to do something different

The Royal Commission has challenged us – as a country and as a national security system – to do things differently, and the success of New Zealand’s Covid-19 response gives us some ideas about how to go about that.

NZSIS is thinking deeply about how we can be more inclusive in our approach to national security.

Recruiting our workforce from Aotearoa’s diverse communities is one way, and that is a very important priority for us.

NZSIS participated fully in the nation-wide hui that were led by Ministers Little and Radhakrishnan to discuss implementing the Royal Commission’s report, and we’ve been following up with our own engagement. All the while we’re listening, learning, engaging, and answering questions.

We are also changing the language we use when we discuss threats both within NZSIS and externally, to make it clear we’re targeting violent extremists of varying ideologies, rather than communities. Our language is adapted from a terminology framework developed by our sister agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. (And following discussions with us, the Australian security system in turn has picked up the framework and adapted it for their own context.)

Our purpose is to be much more specific about the nature of the threat.

We no longer use the term “Extreme Right Wing.”  Instead we use the term Identity-Motivated Violent Extremists to describe those who advocate the use of violence to promote their own identity or denigrate the identity of others. White Identity Violent Extremists such as the Christchurch terrorist generally fall into this category.

The term Faith-Motivated Violent Extremists refers to those who promote the use of violence to advance their own spiritual or religious objectives. This motivation captures violent extremist interpretations of any system of religious belief, including those based on Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, and Buddhism.

Politically-Motivated Violent Extremists promote the use of violence to achieve change to or within a political system; for example, groups or individuals with violent anti-government ideologies.

And finally Single Issue-Motivated Violent Extremists are those who condone the use of violence to achieve a specific outcome on a single issue – such as anti-1080, or anti-vaxxers. Again, I emphasise that we are looking for those that intend to use violence to advance their cause rather than those who simply hold those beliefs.

There are often overlaps between these areas, but the framework is very helpful.

In the counter-intelligence area, we do not usually publicly name the governments that engage in hostile activities against New Zealand. But we are increasingly careful, in our classified reports, to be clear in our language that our concern is with particular foreign governments – not their populations writ large. That is important given that many New Zealand residents and citizens have links back to such countries – and as communities they do not represent a threat.

In my time in this role I have tried – not always completely successfully – to make sure my language doesn’t securitise a particular community. These terms help to make it clear that national security threats do not emanate from mainstream ethnic, political, or religious communities or groups in New Zealand.

NZSIS works with a wide range of communities and groups to carry out our mission and we rely on their help and support. We do not monitor whole communities, but as ideologies or threats evolve and new ones emerge, we need to work with all relevant sectors of society to ensure that they know what behaviours or views represent national security threats and will alert us if they see them. We hope the care we take with language will help us with this engagement.

Concluding remarks

To conclude: there is no doubt that the world is becoming more complex and less stable – and the trends that we were seeing at the end of 2019 have only been exacerbated by the global pandemic.

I think, though, that there is an opportunity now for New Zealand to take a fresh approach to national security.

The Royal Commission has done an excellent job of identifying the challenges – both historical and current – relating to New Zealand’s relationship with national security.  The Royal Commission’s recommendations will help us to chart a more confident and inclusive way forward for New Zealand, a way in which national security is consistent with social cohesion.

And the approach recommended by the Royal Commission is supported by the success that New Zealand has enjoyed in responding to Covid-19.

We have learned the importance of being very careful about describing threats accurately so that we can all unite against them.

We have learned the value of measured, informative, inclusive and confident public communications so that everybody understands their role, what look out for and what to do.

Our experience of Covid-19 has confirmed that an approach that embraces openness, transparency and accountability helps to build public trust.

We have learned that if you get these things right it is possible to have a sensible public discussion about the use of data and technology, and how to achieve the right balance between privacy interests and public security objectives.

NZSIS is very keen to be part of this new approach. We think it will create better security outcomes. We are already changing the way we work, through our recruitment, our public engagement and the language we use.

I am sure that together we can take a fresh approach to national security – a confident and inclusive approach that reflects our national values and unites us behind clear goals. If we can do that I have no doubt we will be better equipped to manage our future domestic security threats in this increasingly uncertain world.

ENDS